The Convention on Cluster Munitions under Pressure: States Parties’ Reaction to the Lithuanian Withdrawal
(Originally published on HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT on 4 October 2024)
The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) faced a critical test during the 12th Meeting of States Parties (12MSP)–what would be the collective reaction of member states to the decision of Lithuania to withdraw from the convention? Lithuania’s decision was approved by its government in late July, and the instrument of withdrawal was submitted to the UN on September 6. While there had been rumors since mid-2023 that the Minister of Defense was interested in withdrawing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs downplayed the risk until June 2024, when the process quickly accelerated.
This blog will discuss the flaws in reasoning behind Lithuania’s hasty decision, the significance of Lithuania’s decision for both the convention and for international humanitarian law more broadly, and the reactions and final outcomes of the 12MSP.
Faulty Logic
In conversations with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and others advocating against Lithuania’s decision, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited heightened security threats in the region and claimed that the potential ability to use cluster munitions after withdrawing from the convention would be a powerful deterrent to further Russian aggression. Its instrument of withdrawal also asserted that “significant advancements in the technology and precision of cluster munitions” would reduce the risk of civilian casualties.
Both such arguments are fallacies put forward largely to justify the decision to its domestic audience. Although cluster munitions can spread the destructive power of hundreds of submunitions over an area of several football fields, the reality is that most of these wide area effect weapons will not hit any military objectives. Following cluster munition use in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, the UK Ministry of Defence concluded that the ability to accurately strike single vehicles would have been preferable. US forces in the 2003 Gulf War had to suspend their advances for fear of detonating their own submunitions that had failed to explode on impact. Some 100 soldiers and 100 clearance personnel were injured by their own submunition duds. After that war, the US Army’s Third Infantry Division labeled one type of cluster munitions (dual-purpose improved conventional munition, or DPICM) “losers” of the war and “relics” of the Cold War.
Moreover, the cluster munitions currently available have the same failed technologies as in the past and will therefore cause the same unacceptable harm to civilians that led to their ban in the first place. Submunitions’ complex design consistently leads to much higher dud rates in combat than in ideal test conditions. Field research on those used in Lebanon in 2006 showed that even those with self-destruct or self-deactivation systems failed at high rates. With very few countries now producing cluster munitions, the only models Lithuania could likely acquire would come from antiquated US stocks with these same deficiencies.
As Lithuania affirms it would only use cluster munitions in a defensive manner, and therefore on its own territory, it would do well to keep in mind the consistent pattern of human suffering that cluster munition use has caused, from the villages of Laos to the olive orchards of Lebanon to the plains of Ukraine. Even when cluster munitions are used over a short period of time–as was the case when 4 million submunitions were used by Israel in Lebanon in 2006–the humanitarian impact and economic burden will last decades.
The Significance of Lithuania’s Decision
The Lithuanian decision must be seen in the context of a broader effort to “de-stigmatize” cluster munitions, which strikes at the core of the CCM’s norms and requires a concerted counter-effort by all state parties and other stakeholders. If states parties do not vigorously and consistently defend the CCM’s norms, we will be witnessing the thin edge of the wedge. When US transfers to Ukraine began in 2023, the US Defense Secretary stated that cluster munitions were a transitional capacity until other, presumably less harmful, munitions became available. Several other waves of transfers have since followed, with a glaring silence by CCM states parties. Many NATO states party to the convention also knew Lithuania was considering withdrawal for over a year yet failed to prevent its action with effective public or bilateral action. As a result, cluster munitions are at risk of being normalized and the power norm established by the CCM undermined.
Lithuania’s withdrawal would be the first time a state has left an international humanitarian law instrument banning a class of weapons. The implications are grave not only for the CCM but also for the fabric of international humanitarian law. The latter’s norms were built up over generations precisely to protect civilians during armed conflict. The role of this body of law in protecting civilians will be undermined if states embrace its norms during peace and reject them in times of tension or conflict. The thought that they should be suspended or waived due to security concerns or, yet worse, during conflict is an affront to the moral and legal purposes of international humanitarian law. What would be the international reaction if a state decided to set aside the ban on biological or chemical weapons? What will be next?
12MSP Reactions and Outcomes
As a result of determined interventions by the Cluster Munition Coalition, states parties from around the world, UN agencies, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the 12MSP sent a strong message to Lithuania and any others that may consider disregarding the CCM’s norms. In their national or joint statements, around two-thirds of the states participating in the meeting expressed deep concern over Lithuania’s departure, with over half of them also asking Lithuania to reverse its decision before March 6, 2025, when the withdrawal takes effect. Many other states used the opportunity to restate their strong commitment to the conventions’ norms and its universalization. A joint statement of five UN agencies and others by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the CMC, and several other civil society organizations all noted their deep dismay over the withdrawal and called on Lithuania to reconsider. The CMC also hosted a panel discussion to refute the myths Lithuania used to justify its decision and to remind delegates why cluster munitions are no longer considered a useful or acceptable part of modern arsenals. The CCM Implementation Support Unit held a similar stakeholder meeting the week preceding the MSP.
All in all, the MSP rose to the occasion with a clear and powerful collective reaction to Lithuania’s decision and more state engagement than there has been in many years. The collective view of states parties was reflected in the final MSP report, which stated that the meeting “deeply regretted” Lithuania’s decision and “urged” it to “reconsider” its withdrawal. It also “strongly condemned the use of cluster munitions by any actor under any circumstances.” The meeting reaffirmed that these weapons have “proved to be unreliable weapons with indiscriminate effects that cause unacceptable harm” and that “any perceived military utility is outweighed by the humanitarian harm they cause.” There was an attempt to weaken all these points by a small group of NATO members, but the Mexican president held firm.
The report also contained positive elements to strengthen the future work of the convention and promote its norms. For example, it included a decision to hold intersessional meetings in 2025, an important mid-year gathering to ensure ongoing challenges are discussed in a more timely manner. The meeting further decided to establish a series of dialogues to begin addressing the serious challenges the CCM and other humanitarian disarmament treaties are currently facing and to develop suggestions for improving the working of the convention before the 2026 Review Conference.
In other positive developments, the MSP celebrated the completion of stockpile destruction (Article 3) obligations by Peru and South Africa, meaning all states parties have now completed this obligation. Belgium was also congratulated for the neutralization of all cluster munitions retained for training purposes by Belgium. And in an important move to highlight the need to do more to protect communities from cluster munition remnants, the MSP decided to appoint a dedicated coordinator for risk education within the CCM machinery and to introduce a separate agenda item on risk education in the agenda of future MSPs.
What we have witnessed in recent months is not only how international norms can be quickly eroded, but also how concerted efforts of traditional CCM partners can effectively respond to such threats. The next year will be critical to ensure that the collective engagement shown at the MSP endures, and that Lithuania feels strong pressure to revoke its withdrawal. States parties and other concerned actors must more forcefully raise the alarm about ongoing US cluster munition transfers and condemn all instances of use. The past year has served as a warning bell for the CCM and international humanitarian law more broadly. All hands must now be on deck to preserve these vital instruments for the protection of civilians in armed conflict worldwide.
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Peter Herby is the head of Petersburg Partnerships, a consultancy on arms-related humanitarian issues based in Geneva. Herby played an important role in public advocacy on cluster munitions from 2001 and led the ICRC’s team that negotiated the CCM in Dublin in 2008.
Tamar Gabelnick is Director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC). As Policy Director of ICBL-CMC (2005-2015), she participated in the negotiation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and led the coalition’s global advocacy work on convention implementation after its adoption.
